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IGNORANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY BLISS: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
EXPANDS THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A KNOWING AND
VOLUNTARY PLEA IN JAMISON v. KLEM
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, defendants' fundamental rights have been a cornerstone
in the American criminal justice system; in recent years, however, the Su-
preme Court has considerably limited the constitutional rights of defend-
ants who forgo ajury trial by entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. 1
This trend is concerning because an overwhelming majority of criminal
cases result in guilty pleas. 2 In 2004, over ninety-five percent of all cases
adjudicated in federal district courts resulted in a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere.
3
A guilty plea, which is ostensibly comparable to a guilty verdict in a
jury trial, represents "the most substantial surrender of constitutional
rights in the criminal justice system."4 Despite the significant role that
guilty pleas play in the American legal system, recognizable judicial safe-
guards for defendants' rights during the plea process did not emerge until
the late 1960s. 5 The Supreme Court, finally acknowledging the vital im-
1. See Julian A. Cook, III, Crumbs from the Master's Table: The Supreme Court, Pro
Se Defendants and the Federal Guilty Plea Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1895, 1895-
96 (2006) (discussing recent Supreme Court rulings that narrowed defendants'
rights during plea process).
2. See Michelle L. DeWaelsche, Student Article, A Lose-Lose Situation? The Inher-
ent Pitfalls of the South Dakota Supreme Court's Decision in Brakeall v. Weber, 50 S.D. L.
REv. 497, 497 (2005) (noting pleas of guilty and nolo contendere account for ma-
jority of total criminal convictions).
3. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE (2004), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
pdf/t5172004.pdf (indicating, for federal district courts in fiscal year 2004, there
were 74,782 convictions, 71,692 of which were by guilty pleas and 460 of which
were by pleas of nolo contendere).
4. John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty Pleas to Aid
CriminalJuror Comprehension, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1187, 1223 (2002) ("[A] criminal
defendant's plea of guilty is 'perhaps the law's most significant waiver of constitu-
tional rights.'" (citing United States v. Andrades, 169 F.3d 131, 132 (2d Cir.
1999))). The Supreme Court noted that defendants who enter a guilty plea effec-
tively waive three fundamental constitutional rights: (1) the right against compul-
sory self-incrimination; (2) the right to a trial by jury; and (3) the right to confront
one's accusers. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed... [and] to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.").
5. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1969) (reversing de-
fendant's conviction based on unknowing and involuntary guilty plea).
(753)
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portance of protecting defendants' constitutional rights during the plea
process, announced that a guilty plea is not valid unless it is both knowing
and voluntary. 6 Although courts have generally accepted that a plea is
voluntary when it is "the voluntary expression of [the defendant's] own
choice," 7 what constitutes a "knowing" plea has been a contentious and
widely litigated issue.8
When the knowing and voluntary requirement was first announced,
"knowing" narrowly meant only that the defendant must be aware of the
nature of the charged offense.9 With the evolution of criminal jurispru-
dence, a "knowing" plea now requires that the defendant understands the
relevant circumstances and direct consequences of entering a guilty
plea.10 Despite the unanimous acceptance of this standard, a debate rages
among the circuit courts regarding what direct consequences a defendant
must be informed of prior to entering a guilty plea." Although the vast
majority of circuit courts have declared that maximum sentences consti-
tute direct consequences, only a minority of circuit courts characterize
minimum sentences as direct consequences. 12
Recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Jamison v. Klemi 3 ex-
panded the due process protections of defendants' constitutional rights by
6. See id. at 466 ("[I]f a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and
knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.").
7. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (defining standard for
voluntary pleas). The standard for voluntariness was premised on existing princi-
ples governing the admissibility of confessions under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due
Process in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 899-900 (1980) (recounting ori-
gins of knowing and voluntary plea requirement). Those principles were designed
to exclude confessions given under circumstances creating a risk of inaccuracy or
coercion. See id. at 900 (citingJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRLS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
8. See Guilty Pleas, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 392, 397-400 (2008)
(recounting evolution ofjudicial standard for "knowing" pleas).
9. See McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 462 (reversing guilty plea because judge failed to
inform defendant of elements of charged offense).
10. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 ("Waivers of constitutional fights not only must
be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness
of relevant circumstances and likely consequences.").
11. Compare United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding
failure to inform defendant of mandatory minimum penalty does not constitute
reversible error), United States v. Powell, 354 F.3d 362, 369 (5th Cir. 2003) (same),
United States v. Berrio-Callejas, 219 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (same), United States
v. Elkins, 176 F.3d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 1999) (same), and United States v. Young,
927 F.2d 1060, 1063 (8th Cir. 1991) (same), with United States v. Fernandez, 205
F.3d 1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding failure to advise defendant of mandatory
minimum sentence is reversible error), United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 405
(4th Cir. 1995) (same), and United States v. Hourihan, 936 F.2d 508, 509-10 (11th
Cir. 1991) (same).
12. For a further discussion of the circuit courts' characterization of maxi-
mum and minimum sentences, see infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
13. 544 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2008).
[Vol. 54: p. 753
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classifying mandatory minimum sentences as direct consequences. 14 This
Casebrief identifies the Third Circuit's analytical approach for determin-
ing the bounds of direct consequences and serves as a guide to practition-
ers challenging the constitutional validity of guilty pleas within the
circuit. 15 Part II reviews the Supreme Court's decisions establishing the
knowing and voluntary plea requirement. 16 Additionally, Part II examines
circuit courts' conflicting interpretations of the Supreme Court's knowing
and voluntary standard. 17 Part III analyzes Jamison, which sets forth the
Third Circuit's rationale for declaring that mandatory minimum sentences
are direct consequences of guilty pleas.1 8 Part IV considers whetherJami-
son is consistent with the Supreme Court's intent, Congress's goals in en-
acting statutory safeguards for the criminal plea process, and other circuit
courts' interpretations of the knowing and voluntary standard. 19 Further-
more, Part IV includes an economic analysis examining the efficiency of
the Third Circuit's ruling.20 Finally, Part V concludes with the prediction
that Jamison will be the last major expansion of defendants' rights during
the plea process.
21
II. WHAT You DON'T KNOW CAN HURT You
A. Federal Safeguards Protecting the Rights of Defendants Entering
Guilty Pleas
The United States government has struggled to balance the need for
a centralized government and the necessity of protecting individual rights
since its inception. 22 The original drafting of the Constitution contained
14. See id. at 277 (declaring judges must inform defendants of applicable
mandatory minimum sentence to protect defendants' fundamental constitutional
rights).
15. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's opinion in Jamison, see infra notes
86-132 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of Congress's and the Supreme Court's development of
the knowing and voluntary plea requirement, see infra notes 22-60 and accompany-
ing text.
17. For an examination of the circuit courts' applications of the knowing and
voluntary plea requirement, see infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
18. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's rationale in Jamison for invalidating
the defendant's guilty plea entered without knowledge of the mandatory mini-
mum sentence, see infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of Jamison in the context of current legal doctrine on
knowing and voluntary pleas, see infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
20. For an economic analysis of the efficiency of Jamison, see infra notes 110-
28 and accompanying text.
21. For an examination of recent trends indicating Jamison will be the last
major expansion of defendants' rights during the plea process, see infra notes 129-
32 and accompanying text.
22. See Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment,
Papular Sovereignty, and "Expressly" Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1889,
1900 (2008) (discussing tensions between Republican and Federalist ideals during
drafting of United States Constitution). The Federalists argued that a Bill of
Rights was unnecessary because the Constitution only granted the federal govern-
20091
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neither an express limitation on federal power nor any explicit protections
of individual rights.2 3 To ensure the Constitution's ratification, the Feder-
alist framers agreed to amend the Constitution by including a Bill of
Rights. 24 Although the enactment of the Bill of Rights included many
provisions ensuring defendants' constitutional rights during a criminal
trial,2 5 it did not contain any provisions expressly protecting the rights of
defendants pleading guilty to criminal charges. 26
The lack of protection for defendants during the plea process re-
mained for over a century, as the federal government did not explicitly
protect defendants' rights during the plea process until the middle of the
twentieth century.2 7 In 1944, Congress enacted Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, outlining the procedures judges must follow
when accepting and rejecting guilty pleas. 28 Enacted to protect defend-
ants' rights by guaranteeing knowing, intelligent, and voluntary pleas,
Rule 11 reads:
ment enumerated powers; further, they argued a Bill of Rights was dangerous be-
cause it could potentially lead to a presumption that only those rights enumerated
in the Bill of Rights were protected. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 64748
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (suggesting Bill of Rights was "unnecessary" and "dan-
gerous"); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to
the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the pro-
posed Constitution but would even be dangerous .... For why declare that things
shall not be done which there is no power to do?").
On the other hand, Republicans were concerned that a Constitution without a
Bill of Rights would give the federal government unlimited power, including the
right to infringe upon traditionally recognized individual rights. See RANDY E. BAR-
NETr, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES IN CONTEXT 32 (2008) ("'[Rulers] are as likely
to use the power with which they are vested, for private purposes, and to the injury
and oppression of those over whom they are placed .... It is therefore ... proper
that bounds should be set to their authority ....'" (quoting Brutus II, November 1,
1787)).
23. See Lash, supra note 22, at 1900 ("[T]he Constitution as originally pro-
posed lacked any provision expressly limiting the scope of federal power-an omis-
sion especially disconcerting for those who also questioned the omission of a Bill
of Rights.").
24. See id. (recounting historical background culminating with enactment of
Bill of Rights).
25. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed ... [and] to be confronted with the witnesses against him.").
26. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X (listing enumerated individual rights pro-
tected by Bill of Rights).
27. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 11 (1944 adoption) (representing first substantive leg-
islative protection of defendants' rights since ratification of Constitution).
28. See id. (announcing requirements for accepting and rejecting guilty
pleas); see also Julian A. Cook, III, Federal Guilty Pleas Under Rule 11: The Unfulfilled
Promise of the Post-Boykin Era, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 597, 606-12 (2006) (discuss-
ing enactment of Rule 11).
[Vol. 54: p. 753
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A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or with consent of the
court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the na-
ture of the charge. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court
refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation
fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
29
Although the original version of Rule 11 generally articulated the
congressional desire to protect defendants' rights throughout the plea
process, the language of the rule was ambiguous as to how a court could
ensure a knowing and voluntary plea to safeguard against post-conviction
attacks. 30 Reacting to inconsistent holdings among lower courts that re-
sulted from the vague and impractical language of Rule 11, Congress sub-
sequently amended the Rule. 31 The current version of Rule 11 includes a
2002 amendment that dictates the procedures for questioning defendants
prior to accepting guilty pleas. 32 The 2002 amendment requires that the
court inquire whether the defendant understands: (1) the constitutional
29. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1944 adoption).
30. See DeWaelsche, supra note 2, at 509 ("Unfortunately, sentencing judges
were often remiss in determining the voluntariness of the plea and the defendant's
understanding of the charge.").
31. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (current through 2002 amendment). As a result of
the 1966 amendment to Rule 11, the sentencing judge was required to: (1) address
the defendant personally; (2) ascertain that the plea was entered voluntarily and
the defendant understood the nature of the charge against him; (3) determine the
defendant comprehended the consequences of a guilty plea; and (4) ensure that
there was a factual basis for the plea. See FED. R. C, M. P. 11 (1966 amendment).
Then, in 1974, Rule 11 was expanded to include a detailed list of advice the court
must offer the defendant prior to accepting a guilty plea including the constitu-
tional rights being waived, the mandatory minimum penalty, and the maximum
penalty. See FED. R. CRM. P. 11 (1974 amendment). In 1982, Rule 11 was
amended to require that the defendant be advised of "the effect of any special
parole term" resulting from a guilty or nolo contendere plea. See FED. R. CRM. P.
11 (1982 amendment). The 1983 amendment added a new subsection (h) which
provided that "[a] variance from the requirements of this rule is harmless error if
it does not affect substantial rights." See FED. R. CriM. P. 11 (1983 amendment). In
1985, the Rule was amended to include a provision which obliged judges to inform
the defendant that his sentence may include restitution, as a component of the
maximum sentence. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 11 (1985 amendment). In 1999, Con-
gress amended the Rule again to ensure that the court advise the defendant of all
appellate rights that are forfeited as a result of pleading guilty or nolo contendere.
See FED. R. ClM. P. 11 (1999 amendment). See generally Cook, supra note 28, at
606-12 (recounting evolution of Rule 11).
32. See FED. R. CRI.N. P. 11 (2002 amendment). The 2002 amendment ex-
panded Rule 11 (b) (1), substantially enhancing the advice a court must offer to the
defendant prior to accepting a plea:
(1) Advising and Questioning the Defendant. Before the court accepts a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant may be placed under
oath, and the court must address the defendant personally in open court.
During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and deter-
mine that the defendant understands, the following:
2009]
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rights being waived; (2) the nature of the charges; (3) the maximum pen-
alty; (4) the mandatory minimum penalty; (5) any applicable forfeiture;
and (6) the court's role in determining an appropriate sentence.3 3 The
current version of Rule 11 articulates a comprehensive standard for know-
ing and voluntary pleas, which has allowed more effective administration
of Rule 11 by lower courts.3
4
(A) the government's right, in a prosecution for perjury or false state-
ment, to use against the defendant any statement that the defendant
gives under oath;
(B) the right to plead not guilty, or having already so pleaded, to persist
in that plea;
(C) the right to a jury trial;
(D) the right to be represented by counsel-and if necessary have the
court appoint counsel-at trial and at every other stage of the
proceeding;
(E) the right at trial to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to
be protected from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and present evi-
dence, and to compel the attendance of witnesses;
(F) the defendant's waiver of these trial rights if the court accepts a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere;
(G) the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading;
(H) any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and
term of supervised release;
(I) any mandatory minimum penalty;
(J) any applicable forfeiture;
(K) the court's authority to order restitution;
(L) the court's obligation to impose a special assessment;
(M) in determining a sentence, the court's obligation to calculate the
applicable sentencing-guideline range and to consider that range, possi-
ble departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, and other sentencing
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and
(N) the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal
or to collaterally attack the sentence.
Id.
33. See id. (articulating legislative standard for knowing and voluntary pleas).
Rule 11 (b) is qualified by Rule 11 (h), the harmless error provision, which states
that "any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded." Id. This provision "rejects the extreme
sanction of automatic reversal" absent proof that the defendant's substantial rights
have been impacted. FED. R. CiM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983). The
harmless error provision provides the lower courts with a great deal of discretion,
often leading to inconsistent applications of the knowing and voluntary plea re-
quirement. See DeWaelsche, supra note 2, at 510-15 (discussing effectiveness of
current Rule 11).
34. See id. (analyzing impact of Rule 11 amendments).
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B. The Evolution of the Knowing and Voluntary Plea Standard
Several of the Rule 11 amendments are the result of Supreme Court
decisions that refined the requirements for a knowing and voluntary
plea. 3 5 The Supreme Court first held that a plea entered involuntarily
and unintelligently violated defendants' constitutionally guaranteed rights
of due process in McCarthy v. United States.3 6 McCarthy pleaded guilty to
three counts of tax evasion; prior to accepting his guilty plea, however, the
district court failed to inquire whether the defendant understood the na-
ture of the charges against him.37 Setting aside the defendant's guilty
plea, the Supreme Court held that the plea was not entered knowingly and
voluntarily. 38 The Court's opinion not only emphasized the importance
of protecting defendants' constitutional rights during the plea process,39
35. See FED. R. CPaM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1944). The original
version of Rule 11 was substantially a restatement of pre-existing law. See id. (citing
Fogus v. United States, 34 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1929)) (recognizing court's affirmative
duty to ascertain that plea is knowing and voluntary). The 1974 amendment codi-
fied the Supreme Court's pronouncement that a defendant must be aware that
certain constitutional rights are being waived by pleading guilty. See FED. R. CRIM.
P. 11 (1974 amendment) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)). Addi-
tionally, the 1974 amendment restated another Supreme Court decision, requiring
that the court address the defendant personally, on the record, prior to accepting
a guilty plea. See id. (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969)).
36. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
37. See id. at 462 (reciting essential facts). When McCarthy entered a plea of
guilty to "willfully and knowingly" attempting to evade tax payments, the district
judge only inquired if he desired to plead guilty, if he understood that such a plea
waived his right to ajury trial, and if he knew the plea subjected him to imprison-
ment for as long as five years and to a fine not to exceed $10,000. See id. (discuss-
ing defendant's guilty plea). McCarthy stated that he understood these
consequences and wanted to plead guilty. See id. (summarizing district court's res-
olution of case). At the sentencing hearing McCarthy stated that he did not "delib-
erately" evade tax payments; however, the judge decided that McCarthy's actions
did not appear to be accidental and therefore, he denied the petition to suspend
the sentence. See id. (reporting procedural posture). On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court had complied
with Rule 11. See id. (summarizing appellate opinion). In its opinion, the Seventh
Circuit announced that a judge is not required to address the defendant person-
ally to determine whether he understands the nature of the charge. See id. (report-
ing procedural posture).
38. See id. at 472 (holding plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily in
violation of defendant's constitutional rights). The Court emphasized the impor-
tance of strictly adhering to Rule 11 procedures to protect defendants' right of due
process. See id. at 465 ("[T]he more meticulously the Rule is adhered to, the more
it tends to discourage, or at least to enable more expeditious disposition of, the
numerous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity
of guilty pleas.").
39. See id. at 472 (stating it is "not too much to require that, before sentencing
defendants to years of imprisonment, district judges take the few minutes neces-
sary to inform them of their rights and to determine whether they understand the
action they are taking").
2009]
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but it also provided the first definition of "knowing": at a minimum, de-
fendants must be aware of the elements of the charged offense.40
That same year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the critical impor-
tance of ensuring that a guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered in
Boykin v. Alabama.41 Boykin was indicted on five counts of common law
robbery.42 Boykin pleaded guilty to all five counts and was sentenced to
death for each indictment. 43 Asserting that his plea was involuntary and
unknowing because "the judge asked no questions of [the] petitioner con-
cerning his plea," Boykin appealed. 44
In Boykin, the Supreme Court noted that a guilty plea waives three
fundamental constitutional rights: (1) the right against self-incrimination;
(2) the right to trial by a jury; and (3) the right to confront one's ac-
cuser.4 5 Recognizing the importance of protecting defendants' constitu-
tional rights, the Court refused to "presume a waiver of these three
important federal rights from a silent record."4 6 Thus, expanding the Mc-
Carthy standard for a "knowing" plea, Boykin articulated additional require-
ments. 4 7 The Court stated that, "'the record examination of the
defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that
the defendant understands the nature of the charges.. . the acts sufficient
to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible
range of sentences."' 4
8
Although McCarthy and Boykin announced and attempted to define
the "knowing" plea requirement, lower courts continued to inconsistently
40. See id. at 471 (announcing that courts must inform defendant of elements
of charged offense prior to accepting defendant's guilty plea).
41. 395 U.S. 239 (1969).
42. See id. at 239 (reciting essential facts). Boykin was a twenty-seven year old
African-American male accused of committing five armed robberies over a two-
week period in Mobile, Alabama. See id. (same).
43. See id. at 240 (noting defendant's sentence).
44. Id. at 239 (asserting guilty plea is constitutionally invalid because district
court never directly addressed defendant prior to accepting plea). The Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to uphold the plea. See id.
(reporting procedural posture).
45. See id. at 243 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (find-
ing that fight to jury trial guaranteed by Sixth Amendment applies to states
through Fourteenth Amendment); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)
(finding that right to confront one's accusers guaranteed by Sixth Amendment
applies to states through Fourteenth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6
(1964) (holding that privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by Fifth
Amendment applies to states through Fourteenth Amendment)).
46. Id. at 243-44 ("What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprison-
ment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the
matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea
connotes and of its consequence.").
47. See id. at 244 n.7 (announcing heightened standard for knowing and vol-
untary pleas).
48. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Rundle, 237 A.2d 196, 197-98 (Pa. 1968)).
[Vol. 54: p. 753
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interpret and apply the standard for a "knowing" plea.49 In 1970, Brady v.
United States50 helped resolve the ambiguity and impracticality of the Su-
preme Court's previous rulings by articulating a new standard for a "know-
ing" plea. 51 Brady, on trial for kidnapping charges, faced the death
penalty because he harmed the victim during the crime; Brady pleaded
guilty and received a sentence of fifty years in prison. 52 Brady challenged
his sentence, arguing his plea was made involuntarily and unknowingly. 5 3
Once again, recognizing the crucial importance of shielding defendants'
constitutional rights during the plea process, 54 the Supreme Court an-
nounced that "[w]aivers of constitutional rights ... must be knowing, in-
telligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences." 5
5
Attempting to clarify this vague standard for a "knowing" plea, the
Court expounded that "'[a] plea of guilty [must be] entered by one fully
aware of the direct consequences."' 56 This short, concise language has
drastically altered the guilty plea process. Courts have construed this lan-
guage by negative implication to mean that defendants do not need to be
informed of some consequences-appropriately termed collateral conse-
quences.5 7 Applying the Brady definition of a "knowing" plea, lower
courts must explain to the defendant only direct consequences, not collat-
49. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CoRNELL L. REv. 697, 704 (2002) (discussing
lower courts' struggle to determine what information courts must provide defend-
ants to protect pleas from post-conviction attack for due process violations).
50. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
51. See id. at 748 (requiring knowledge of relevant circumstances and direct
consequences for "knowing" pleas).
52. See id. at 743 (reciting essential facts). Brady's plea was accepted after the
trial judge inquired twice, on the record, whether the plea was voluntary. See id.
(same).
53. See id. at 744 (challenging plea's constitutionality). Brady claimed that his
guilty plea was not voluntary because: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) coerced his plea; (2)
his counsel exerted impermissible pressure upon him; (3) he was misinformed
that a plea would reduce the sentence; and (4) the trial judge failed to comply with
Rule 11. See id. (asserting basis for constitutional challenge). After hearing
Brady's appeal, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico held that the
plea was voluntary and denied relief; this decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See id. at 745 (reciting procedural posture).
54. See id. at 748 ("That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted
only with care and discernment has long been recognized.").
55. Id. (announcing that "knowing" pleas require defendants' awareness of
relevant circumstances and likely consequences); see also Henderson v. Morgan,
426 U.S. 637, 650 (1976) (reiterating that defendants "must be informed of the
consequences of [their] plea").
56. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572
n.2 (5th Cir. 1957)).
57. See Chin, supra note 49, at 728 (discussing lower courts' interpretations of
Brady); see also United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("We
presume that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it used the word 'direct';
by doing so, it excluded collateral consequences.").
2009]
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eral consequences. 58 Although the direct-collateral distinction provided
significant guidance to lower courts, this standard proved to have a critical
weakness.5 9 Specifically, the standard left one major question looming
over the lower courts: which consequences are direct and which conse-
quences are collateral?
60
C. Circuit Courts' Application of the Collateral Consequence Rule
The majority of circuit courts, confronted with defendants challeng-
ing their pleas' validity, have upheld guilty pleas by expanding the defini-
tion of collateral consequences and narrowing the definition of direct
consequences. 61 Nonetheless, there remains a circuit split over what con-
58. See Chin, supra note 49, at 704 (examining implications of direct-collateral
distinction announced in Brady). Some courts define direct consequences as those
consequences that are largely automatic. See id. (discussing one interpretation of
"direct consequences"); see also United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 966-67
(9th Cir. 2000) (declaring direct consequences are those which occur as automatic
responses to pleading guilty). Other courts interpret direct consequences as those
within the court's control. See Chin, supra note 49, at 704 (discussing another in-
terpretation of "direct consequences"); see also United States v. Gonzales, 202 F.3d
20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) ("What renders the plea's immigration effects 'collateral' is
not that they arise 'virtually by operation of law,' but the fact that deportation is
'not the sentence of the court which accept[s] the plea but of another agency over
which the trial judge has no control and for which he has no responsibility."'
(quoting Frutchman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976))).
59. See Guilty Pleas, supra note 8, at 397-402 (noting circuit courts' inconsistent
application of direct-collateral distinction).
60. See Chin, supra note 49, at 705 (reporting confusion among lower courts
over which consequences are direct); see also United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35,
38 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The distinction between a collateral and a direct conse-
quence of a criminal conviction, like many of the lines drawn in legal analysis, is
obvious at the extremes and often subtle at the margin.").
61. See Chin, supra note 49, at 705-06 (listing consequences of criminal convic-
tions that circuit courts have deemed collateral); see also, e.g., United States v.
Humphrey, 164 F.3d 585, 587 (11th Cir. 1999) (determining possibility of consecu-
tive rather than concurrent sentences to be collateral consequence); Parry v.
Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding revocation of probation is
not direct consequence); United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of
$228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 914-17 (2d Cir. 1990) (determining civil forfeiture to be
collateral consequence of criminal conviction); Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d
1545, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1989) (ruling ineligibility of parole to be collateral conse-
quence); Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining poten-
tial relocation from youth center to prison to be collateral consequence); Landry v.
Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1988) (ruling loss of professional license
to be collateral consequence of criminal conviction); United States v. Rubalcaba,
811 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing consecutive rather than concurrent
sentencing to be collateral consequence of criminal conviction); United States v.
King, 618 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding potential civil tax liability to be collat-
eral consequence); Sanchez v. United States, 572 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1977)
(declaring revocation of parole to be collateral consequence); Fruchtman v.
Kenton, 531 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1976) (determining potential deportation is not
direct consequence of criminal conviction); United States v. Saldana, 505 F.2d 628,
628 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that potential consecutive rather than concurrent
sentences is not direct consequence of criminal conviction); Paradiso v. United
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CASEBRIEF
stitutes direct consequences. 6 2 Central to this debate, one question is re-
peatedly posed: is a mandatory minimum sentence a direct
consequence?
63
In Boykin, the Supreme Court announced that a defendant must be
aware of "the permissible range of sentences." 64 By implication, this
makes a sentence range a direct consequence of a guilty plea. 65 Nonethe-
less, most circuit courts have not required the court to inform the defen-
dant of the sentence range, minimum to maximum. Interpreting the
Supreme Court's decision, the majority of circuit courts hold that, at a
minimum, a defendant must be aware of the offense's maximum penalty
because the maximum penalty is a direct consequence of a criminal
conviction.
66
States, 482 F.2d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 1973) (finding consecutive rather than concur-
rent sentencing to be collateral consequence of criminal conviction); Cuthrell v.
Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (4th Cir. 1973) (deciding civil commit-
ment to be collateral consequence); Weaver v. United States, 454 F.2d 315, 317-18
(7th Cir. 1971) (declaring revocation of probation is not direct consequence);
United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1970) (recognizing that con-
secutive rather than concurrent sentencing is not direct consequence of criminal
conviction); Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1967) (deter-
mining ineligibility of parole is not direct consequence); Meaton v. United States,
328 F.2d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 1964) (finding loss of civic rights to be collateral conse-
quence); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1963) (holding disen-
franchisement to be collateral consequence of criminal conviction); Redwine v.
Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (recognizing dishonorable discharge from
armed services to be collateral consequence); United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d
919, 921 (2d Cir. 1954) (finding deportation is not direct consequence of criminal
conviction); United States v. Okelberry, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1248 (D. Utah 2000)
(citing Unites States v. Morse, 36 F.3d 1070, 1072 (11th Cir. 1994)) (determining
disqualification from public benefits to be collateral consequence); State v. Vas-
quez, 889 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. App. 1994) (citing United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d
354 (5th Cir. 1993)) (declaring that ineligibility to serve on jury is not direct conse-
quence of criminal conviction).
62. See Chin, supra note 49, at 703-12 (noting inconsistent application of di-
rect-collateral distinction among circuit courts).
63. For a discussion of whether a mandatory minimum is a direct conse-
quence, see infra notes 64-109 and accompanying text.
64. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 (1969) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Rundle, 237 A.2d 196, 198 (Pa. 1968)).
65. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (holding that, for plea to
be "knowing," defendant must be aware of direct consequences of guilty plea);
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 n.7 (stating that defendant must be informed of permissible
range of sentences).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding judges must advise defendants of statutory maximums associated with
charges prior to accepting plea); United States v. DeJesus-Abad, 263 F.3d 5, 8 (2d
Cir. 2001) (holding courts must inform defendants at plea allocution of maximum
possible penalty for charged offense); United States v. Fernandez, 205 F.3d 1020,
1028 (7th Cir. 2000) (determining court's failure to accurately advise defendant of
maximum penalty constitutes reversible error); United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d
1193, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 1998) (deciding guilty plea entered without knowledge of
offense's maximum penalty is invalid); United States v. Coscarelli, 105 F.3d 984,
990-91 (5th Cir. 1997) (ruling court's failure to inform defendant about maximum
2009]
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Conversely, the majority of circuit courts classify mandatory minimum
sentences as collateral consequences; accordingly, failure to inform a de-
fendant of mandatory minimums constitutes harmless error as long as the
defendant, prior to pleading, was aware of the maximum sentence. 67 On
the other hand, a minority of circuit courts classifies mandatory mini-
mums as direct consequences; under this interpretation, failure to inform
a defendant of mandatory minimums constitutes reversible error. 68 Thus,
with disagreement among the circuit courts, defendants' fundamental
constitutional rights at stake, and principles of due process at the core of
the issue, the Third Circuit's decision in Jamison v. Klem provided neces-
sary guidance to judges and practitioners confronted with post-conviction
attacks asserting that a plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered.
69
penalty constitutes reversible error); United States v. Gray, 63 F.3d 57, 60-61 (1st
Cir. 1995) (finding reversible error when court misinformed defendant about
maximum possible sentence); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119 (4th
Cir. 1991) (determining failure to advise defendant of applicable maximum sen-
tence is reversible error); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d Cir.
1991) (ruling offense's maximum penalty is direct consequence of plea therefore
requiring that defendant be advised of it).
On the other hand, a minority of circuit courts has held that failure to inform
a defendant of the applicable maximum sentence constitutes harmless error. See,
e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 132 F.3d 34, 39 (6th Cir. 1997) (determining failure
to advise defendant of maximum sentences is harmless error); United States v.
Young, 927 F.2d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding failure to inform defendant
of maximum penalties is not reversible error).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2005) (ruling
court's failure to inform defendant of mandatory minimum penalty does not enti-
tie defendant to withdraw plea because court had informed defendant of maxi-
mum penalty); United States v. Powell, 354 F.3d 362, 369 (5th Cir. 2003)
(determining court's failure to inform defendant of mandatory restitution does
not constitute reversible error); United States v. Berrio-Callejas, 219 F.3d 1, 1 (1st
Cir. 2000) (finding court's failure to inform defendant of mandatory minimum
sentence constitutes harmless error); United States v. Elkins, 176 F.3d 1016, 1021
(7th Cir. 1999) (deciding court's failure to inform defendant that he could be
sentenced to term of supervised release in addition to statutory maximum impris-
onment constitutes harmless error); Young, 927 F.2d at 1062 (holding that where
defendant actually knew statutory maximum and minimum sentences, district
court's violation of Rule 11 was harmless error).
68. See, e.g., Fernandez, 205 F.3d at 1029 (deciding that failure to advise defen-
dant of mandatory minimum constitutes reversible error); United States v. Goins,
51 F.3d 400, 405 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding failure to inform defendant that guilty
plea would result in mandatory minimum sentence of five years constitutes revers-
ible error); United States v. Hourihan, 936 F.2d 508, 509-10 (11th Cir. 1991) (al-
lowing defendant to withdraw plea because court failed to inform defendant of
mandatory minimum sentence).
69. SeeJamison v. Klem, 544 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (considering validity of
guilty pleas entered without knowledge of applicable mandatory minimum
sentence).
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III. "THERE Is NoTHING MORE FRIGHTENING THAN IGNORANCE
IN AcTION"
7 0
A. The Third Circuit Defines Direct Consequences
Although the Third Circuit has defined and redefined collateral con-
sequences, 7 1 the court did not define direct consequences until 1991-
over twenty years after Brady announced the direct-collateral distinction. 72
In United States v. Salmon,73 four defendants were found guilty of conspir-
acy and crimes relating to the distribution and sale of cocaine.7 4 Washing-
ton, one of the defendants, received an enhanced sentence because he
was classified as a "career offender" based on two prior convictions. 7 5
Washington challenged his status as a "career offender," asserting that his
pleas of guilty and nolo contendere to the predicate offenses were entered
70. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Famous Quotes and Authors, http://www.
famousquotesandauthors.com/topics/ignorance-quotes.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2009).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988)
(declaring deportation to be collateral consequence of guilty plea); Kincade v.
United States, 559 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1977) (announcing delayed prison sen-
tence due to subsequent state court conviction to be collateral consequence);
United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3d Cir. 1976) (recognizing job loss
to be collateral consequence of guilty plea); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180,
186 (3d Cir. 1963) (declaring deprivation of voting rights to be collateral conse-
quence of conviction).
72. See United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d Cir. 1991) (announc-
ing Third Circuit's definition of direct consequences).
73. 944 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1991).
74. See id. at 1113 (reciting essential facts). An undercover police officer ar-
ranged to buy cocaine from Washington and Surratt, two of the defendants. See id.
at 1111-12. Due to the large request for cocaine, Washington had to arrange a
meeting with three separate cocaine suppliers to fulfill the undercover police of-
ficer's order. See id. at 1112. During the meeting, Washington met with two men,
later identified as co-defendants Fitzpatrick and Salmon; the three men conferred
at the trunk of Fitzpatrick's Oldsmobile. See id. The three men and Surratt, who
was present at a previous drug exchange with the undercover police officer, were
arrested. See id. A grand jury indicted Fitzpatrick, Salmon, Surratt, and Washing-
ton in a five-count indictment: count one charged all four defendants with conspir-
ing to possess with intent to distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846; count two charged Washington and Surratt with possession with
intent to distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841 (a) (1) and 841(b) (1) (C); count three charged Washington, Salmon, and
Fitzpatrick with the same offense; count four charged Washington with intention-
ally using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1); and count five charged Washington with possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). See id. at 1112-13 (reciting
five-count indictment for conspiracy, drug trafficking, and firearm violations).
75. See id. at 1113 (sentencing Washington, as career criminal, to terms of 210
months incarceration for first three counts and 120 months imprisonment for
count five). Washington was classified as a career offender based on two prior
convictions; in 1975, Washington pleaded nolo contendere to selling heroin and
in 1980, he pleaded guilty to burglarizing a dwelling. See id. at 1129-30 (detailing
Washington's criminal history).
13
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unknowingly because he was unaware of the convictions' impact on future
sentences.
76
Rejecting Washington's argument, the Third Circuit affirmed the "ca-
reer offender" classification and the enhanced prison sentence. 77 In its
opinion, the court not only reaffirmed the direct-collateral distinction an-
nounced in Brady; it also defined direct consequences. 78 The Third Cir-
cuit declared in Salmon that "the only consequences considered direct are
the maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged.
79
Four years later, in Parry v. Rosemeyer,80 the Third Circuit reaffirmed
Salmon's definition of direct consequences.8 1 Parry pleaded guilty to rob-
bery and criminal conspiracy; he was sentenced to a maximum of twenty-
three months in prison for the robbery and two years of probation for
conspiracy.8 2 Parry completed his prison term, but while on probation, he
was arrested for burglary and subsequently sentenced to a prison term of
two to ten years for his previous conspiracy offense.
8 3
Parry filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging his guilty plea was
involuntary and unknowing because he was not advised that, following a
parole violation, the court could revoke probation and impose a prison
sentence.8 4 Citing Salmon, the Third Circuit denied Parry's habeas peti-
tion, concluding that the repercussions of a probation violation are not
76. See id. at 1130 (challenging constitutionality of career offender
classification).
77. See id. (upholding Washington's career offender classification and subse-
quent enhanced sentence).
78. See id. ("Due process requires that a guilty plea be voluntary, that is, that a
defendant be advised of and understand the direct consequences of a plea."); see
also United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3d Cir. 1976) (declaring due
process does not require defendant, prior to pleading guilty, to be informed of
"collateral, but foreseeable, adverse consequences").
79. Salmon, 944 F.2d at 1130 (citing United States v. Pearson, 910 F.2d 221,
223 (5th Cir. 1990)) (indicating direct consequences are limited to maximum
penalties).
80. 64 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 1995).
81. See id. at 114 (defining direct consequences as offense's maximum prison
term and fine).
82. See id. at 112 (reciting essential facts). At the guilty plea hearing, the
judge recounted the terms of the plea agreement to the defendant; the judge,
however, failed to inform the defendant of the repercussions of a probation viola-
tion. See id. (discussing defendant's guilty plea).
83. See id. (reporting aftermath of Parry's probation violation). After being
found guilty by a jury, Parry was sentenced to an additional four to eight years of
imprisonment on the new burglary charges. See id. at n.3 (recounting results of
Parry's trial).
84. See id. (asserting guilty plea was entered into unknowingly and involunta-
rily). After unsuccessfully seeking relief in state court under the Post Conviction
Relief Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9541, Parry filed a petition for habeas corpus
in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. See id. (noting proce-
dural posture). The District Attorney of Allegheny County adopted the Report
and Recommendation filed by the magistrate judge and dismissed the petition. See
id. (same).
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direct consequences 8 5 The clear and concise definition of direct conse-
quences, announced in Salmon and applied in Parry, provided guidance
for nearly twenty years to Third Circuit courts confronted with defendants
challenging the validity of their guilty pleas.
B. Jamison v. Klein: Redefining Direct Consequences
In the 2008 case, Jamison v. Klem, the Third Circuit significantly al-
tered its guilty plea jurisprudence by undermining the Salmon definition
of direct consequences.8 6 In September 2000, Jamison was arrested for
drug possession with intent to sell. 87 Jamison pleaded guilty; the court
sentenced him to five to ten years in prison and imposed a fine of
$30,000.88 Jamison filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus challenging
the voluntariness of his guilty plea.8 9 Specifically, Jamison claimed that his
85. See id. at 114 ("The only consequences considered direct are the maxi-
mum prison term and fine for the offense charged." (quoting United States v.
Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d Cir. 1991))). The Third Circuit noted that Parry,
prior to pleading guilty, was informed that the maximum penalty for conspiracy
was ten years imprisonment; the court determined that knowledge of the applica-
ble maximum penalty precluded Parry from successfully claiming his plea was "un-
knowing." See id. at 114 n.6. Concluding the opinion, the Third Circuit noted its
recent decisions limiting "direct consequences." See id. at 114; see also, e.g., United
States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988) (declaring deportation to
be collateral consequence); Kincade v. United States, 559 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.
1977) (ruling consecutive rather than concurrent sentencing is not direct conse-
quence of pleading guilty); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3d Cir.
1976) (holding job loss due to felony conviction to be collateral consequence of
pleading guilty); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1963) (deter-
mining loss of voting rights to be collateral consequence).
86. SeeJamison v. Klein, 544 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (considering validity of
guilty pleas entered without knowledge of applicable mandatory minimum
sentence).
87. See id. at 268 (reciting essential facts). Jamison was charged in two sepa-
rate cases; one case charged him with possession of cocaine and marijuana with
intent to deliver, and the other case charged him with possession of marijuana,
driving without a license, and reckless endangerment. See id. (noting charges
against Jamison).
88. See id. at 269 (recounting factual background). Prior to trial, Jamison re-
jected the prosecution's plea agreement; the agreement offered a prison sentence
for between four and eight years. See id. at 268 (same). AfterJamison entered an
open guilty plea, the prosecution continued to recommend four to eight years. See
id. at 269 (noting Jamison's guilty plea and Government's recommended sen-
tence). After accepting the plea, the court sentenced Jamison to five to ten years
in prison, imposed a fine of $30,000 for the cocaine conviction, and enacted a
concurrent sentence of two to four years for the marijuana charge. See id. at 269-70
(describing Jamison's sentence).
89. See id. at 268 (challenging guilty plea's constitutionality). Concluding that
Jamison's plea was entered unknowingly because Jamison was not advised of the
mandatory minimum sentence, the magistrate judge recommended thatJamison's
habeas petition be granted. See id. (reciting procedural posture). The district
court rejected the recommendation and denied the petition, noting that the Su-
preme Court has not explicitly required courts to advise defendants of the charges'
mandatory minimum penalties. See id. (same). Specifically, the district court
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plea was involuntary and unknowing because prior to accepting his guilty
plea, he was not informed of the mandatory minimum sentence; instead,
the judge advised him only of the maximum sentence. 90 The government,
relying on Parry, argued that "'a maximum prison term and fine for the
challenged offense are the only direct consequences of a state court
plea.' "91
In an unprecedented shift in guilty plea jurisprudence, the Third Cir-
cuit declared that mandatory minimum sentences are direct conse-
quences.9 2 The court reasoned that mandatory minimums are more
relevant to the defendant's decision to enter a plea than maximum
sentences, which are rarely imposed. 93 Further, the court reasoned that
the Salmon definition of direct consequences only applies to factually simi-
lar cases and was narrowly meant to explain that "' [d] ue process does not
... require that a defendant be advised of adverse collateral consequences
of pleading guilty, even if they are foreseeable.'
9 4
In declaring that mandatory minimum sentences are direct conse-
quences, the Third Circuit's pivotal decision in Jamison effectively over-
ruled Salmon's bright-line definition of a "knowing" plea.9 5 What replaces
found the state courts' rejection ofJamison's claim was neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See id. (same).
90. See id. at 269 (describingJamison's plea process and sentencing). Jamison
used the court record to show that he was not adequately informed of the applica-
ble mandatory minimum sentence during the plea process. See id. (same). First,
the only statement made at the plea hearing regarding the mandatory minimum
sentence was a brief statement by the prosecution that "[they] will be filing
mandatory on the drug case." See id. (same). Second, during the hearing, the
judge toldJamison that because there was no agreement with the Commonwealth,
sentencing would be left in the court's discretion. See id. ("The judge asked Jami-
son if he understood that sentencing was 'basically up to the court,' and Jamison
affirmed that he did."). Third, the written guilty plea colloquyJamison filled out
and signed only addressed whether Jamison acknowledged the applicable maxi-
mum penalty. See id. (recounting Jamison's plea process).
91. Id. at 277 (quoting Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 1995)).
92. See id. ("The mandatory minimum is no less direct a consequence of a
guilty plea.").
93. See id. ("In fact, the mandatory minimum sentence may be far more rele-
vant than the theoretical maximum because that is rarely imposed.").
94. Id. at 278 (quoting Parry, 64 F.3d at 114) (alteration in original). The
Third Circuit asserted that the rule from Salmon should only be applied in factually
similar cases, not to all cases where a defendant is challenging a guilty plea's consti-
tutionality. See id. (recounting Third Circuit's rationale for distinguishing Salmon
and Parry from Jamison). The court claimed that when Parry and Salmon are consid-
ered in context, it is clear that the holdings are consistent with Jamison because all
three cases are reasonable applications of the direct-collateral distinction first an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Brady v. United States. a "knowing" plea man-
dates that a defendant must be informed of the direct consequences of pleading
guilty, but not the collateral consequences. See id. (asserting that Salmon, Parry,
and Jamison are consistent).
95. Compare id. at 277 ("The mandatory minimum is no less direct a conse-
quence of a guilty plea."), with United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d
Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe only consequences considered direct are the maximum prison
[Vol, 54: p. 753
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 5 [2009], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol54/iss5/3
the Salmon definition remains unclear. The Third Circuit's proclamation
in Jamison may have created a new bright-line definition of direct conse-
quences, limited to only maximum and minimum penalties, or it may have
simply overruled Salmon, concluding that direct consequences encompass
more than just the offense's maximum penalty.
IV. "A LITTLE LEARNING IS A DANGEROUS THING, BUT A LOT OF
IGNORANCE IS JUST AS BAD"
9 6
A. The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Third Circuit Agree:
Knowledge Is Power
Although the Third Circuit's holding in Jamison represents a vast de-
parture from its previous analyses of the knowing and voluntary standard,
it is consistent with the goals of the legislature and the pronouncements of
the Supreme Court.9 7 Acknowledging the significant role of the guilty
plea in the criminal justice system, Congress enacted Rule 11 to ensure
guilty pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily to protect defendants'
constitutional rights. 9 8 The Supreme Court has echoed this sentiment;
because a plea is a waiver of several constitutional rights, the Court re-
quires that a plea be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." 99
Expanding the definition of direct consequences to include
mandatory minimum sentences is not only consistent with the judicial and
legislative aim of guaranteeing that a guilty plea represents the defen-
dant's deliberate and informed decision, but there is also evidence that
both the Supreme Court and Congress specifically intended mandatory
minimums to be a requirement for a "knowing" plea. In Boykin v. Ala-
bama, the Supreme Court announced that "the trial court ... should in-
clude, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands
the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to
term and fine for the offense charged." (citing United States v. Pearson, 910 F.2d
221, 223 (5th Cir. 1990))).
96. Robert Alan Edwards, The Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.
com/quotes/BobEdwards/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2009).
97. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit's holding inJamison is consistent
with congressional and judicial aims, see infra notes 98-102 and accompanying
text.
98. See FED. R. C~iM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1944) ("The fairness
and adequacy of the procedures on acceptance of pleas of guilty are of vital impor-
tance in according equal justice to all in the federal courts."); Alicia Warning Tru-
man, Note, Unexpected Evictions: Why Drug Offenders Should Be Warned Others Could
Lose Public Housing If They Plead Guilty, 89 IowA L. REv. 1753, 1765 (2004)
("[T]hree objectives for the rule [are]: '(1) ensuring that the guilty plea is free
from coercion; (2) ensuring that the defendant understands the nature of the
charges against her; and (3) ensuring that the defendant is aware of the direct
consequences of the guilty plea.'" (quoting United States v. Camacho, 233 F.3d
1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000))).
99. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (advocating knowing and vol-
untary requirement for pleas of guilty and nolo contendere) (emphasis added).
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constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of
sentences."' 00 In Jamison, the Third Circuit determined that the Supreme
Court's language in Boykin explicitly mandated that a defendant be in-
formed of both mandatory maximums and minimums. 10 1 Similarly, one
of the requirements Congress enumerated in Rule 11 (b) is that the sen-
tencing judge must inform the defendant of "the mandatory minimum
sentence."10 2 Based on this evidence, the Third Circuit's decision in Jami-
son is consistent with the principles and requirements pronounced by the
Supreme Court and Congress.
B. The Other Circuit Courts Disagree: Less Is More
Despite the incontrovertible evidence of the Supreme Court's and
legislature's intent to expand the "knowing" requirement to include
mandatory minimums, only two other circuit courts have explicitly held
that mandatory minimum sentences are direct consequences of entering a
guilty plea.10 3 Jamison not only conflicts with the majority of circuit courts
by classifying mandatory minimums as direct consequences, but it also
stands in stark contrast to the other circuit courts' recent trend-narrow-
ing the definition of direct consequences. 10 4 The majority of circuit court
decisions addressing post-conviction attacks have upheld the plea by ex-
panding the definition of collateral consequences and simultaneously nar-
rowing the definition of direct consequences. 10 5 Repercussions of
convictions deemed collateral consequences include: revocation of parole
or probation, ineligibility for parole, civil commitment, civil forfeiture,
consecutive rather than concurrent sentencing, higher penalties based on
repeat offender laws, sex offender registration requirements, disen-
franchisement, ineligibility to serve on a jury, disqualification from public
benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, deportation, dishonorable dis-
charge from the armed services, and loss of business or professional
licenses. 10 6
100. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 (1969) (emphasis added).
101. SeeJamison v. Klem, 544 F.3d 266, 277 (3d Cir. 2008) (interpreting per-
missible sentence range as minimum and maximum sentences).
102. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b)(1)(I) (1966 amendment) (listing requirements of
knowing and voluntary pleas).
103. See United States v. Fernandez, 205 F.3d 1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (de-
ciding failure to advise defendant of mandatory minimum constitutes reversible
error); United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 405 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding failure to
inform defendant that guilty plea would result in mandatory minimum sentence of
five years constituted reversible error); cf. United States v. Hourihan, 936 F.2d 508,
509-10 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing defendant to withdraw plea because court failed
to inform defendant of mandatory minimum sentence).
104. See Chin, supra note 49, at 705-06 (noting recent expansion of collateral
consequences and subsequent contraction of direct consequences).
105. See id. (listing recent circuit court decisions expanding collateral
consequences).
106. See id. (noting recent circuit court cases addressing direct-collateral dis-
tinction); see also, e.g., United States v. Humphrey, 164 F.3d 585, 587 (11th Cir.
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One potential explanation for this trend is the fear that expanding
the definition of direct consequences would expose a large number of
convictions to reversal. 10 7 Additionally, some commentators fear that ad-
judicating an increased number of constitutional challenges would sub-
stantially raise courts' administrative costs.108 Although most circuit
courts use the increased costs argument to justify narrowing direct conse-
quences and subsequently limiting defendants' rights, there are other
1999) (determining possibility of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences to
be collateral consequence); Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding revocation of probation is not direct consequence); United States v. U.S.
Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 914-17 (2d Cir. 1990) (de-
termining civil forfeiture is not direct consequence); Holmes v. United States, 876
F.2d 1545, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1989) (ruling ineligibility of parole to be collateral
consequence); Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining
potential relocation from juvenile correction facility to prison is not direct conse-
quence of criminal conviction); Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir.
1988) (ruling loss of professional license to be collateral consequence of criminal
conviction); United States v. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1987) (recog-
nizing consecutive rather than concurrent sentencing to be collateral effect of
criminal conviction); United States v. King, 618 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding potential civil tax liability to be collateral consequence); Sanchez v.
United States, 572 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1977) (declaring revocation of parole to
be collateral consequence); Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1976)
(determining potential deportation is not direct consequence of criminal convic-
tion); United States v. Saldana, 505 F.2d 628, 628 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that
potential consecutive rather than concurrent sentences is not direct consequence
of criminal conviction); Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 1973)
(finding consecutive rather than concurrent sentencing to be collateral conse-
quence); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (4th Cir. 1973)
(deciding civil commitment to be collateral effect); Weaver v. United States, 454
F.2d 315, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1971) (declaring revocation of probation is not direct
consequence); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1970) (recog-
nizing consecutive rather than concurrent sentencing is not direct consequence of
criminal conviction); Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1967)
(determining ineligibility of parole is not direct consequence of pleading guilty);
Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379, 380 (5th Cir. 1964) (finding loss of civic
rights to be collateral consequence); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186
(3d Cir. 1963) (holding disenfranchisement to be collateral consequence of crimi-
nal conviction); Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (recogniz-
ing dishonorable discharge from armed services to be collateral consequence);
United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1954) (finding deportation is
not direct consequence of criminal conviction); United States v. Okelberry, 112 F.
Supp. 2d 1246, 1248 (D. Utah 2000) (citing United States v. Morse, 36 F.3d 1070,
1072 (11th Cir. 1994)) (determining disqualification from public benefits to be
collateral consequence); State v. Vasquez, 889 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. App. 1994)
(citing United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993)) (declaring ineligibility
to serve on jury is not direct consequence of criminal conviction).
107. See Chin, supra note 49, at 736 ("[T]he impact is greatest when new
grounds for setting aside guilty pleas are approved because the vast majority of
criminal convictions result from such pleas." (quoting United States v. Timmreck,
441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979))).
108. See Note, Rule 11 and Collateral Attack on Guilty Pleas, 86 YALE L.J. 1395,
1415 (1977) ("Such hearings unquestionably will intensify the already considerable
strain that post conviction petitions place on courts and correctional
institutions.").
2009]
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costs and benefits which the circuit courts have not properly evaluated,
such as the economic efficiency of deeming mandatory minimums direct
consequences of guilty pleas.10 9
C. The Efficiency of the Third Circuit's Rule
Over the last thirty years, scholars have applied economic analysis to
substantive areas of the law to determine whether a particular judicial or
legislative doctrine is efficient.110 Although efficiency has been inter-
preted in various ways, 1 1' one definition, Kaldor-Hick's efficiency, has
been largely adopted by economists. 1 2 In a Kaldor-Hick's analysis, a rule
is efficient if those individuals who benefit from it would prefer the rule
even if they were obliged to compensate those individuals harmed by the
rule. 11 3 In other words, if the total benefit to society exceeds the total cost
to society, the rule is efficient.1 14 To further increase the net benefit, or
surplus, to society, a rule should place the cost on the cheapest cost
avoider. 115 The cheapest cost avoider is the party who has the lowest cost,
109. For a discussion of the costs and benefits of informing defendants of the
mandatory minimum sentences for their crimes, see infta notes 110-28 and accom-
panying text.
110. See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAw
AND ECONOMICS V (1992) (summarizing history of economic analysis).
111. SeeJohn D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Econom-
ics, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 404-14 (2008) (describing evolution of economic effi-
ciency). The basis of modem economic efficiency can be found in the philosophy
promulgated by welfarists. See id. at 405 (same). Welfarists believed that it was
possible to determine whether a rule causes an improvement or a degradation of
society. See id. (explaining principles of welfarism). Italian economist Vilfredo
Pareto took the basic concept of welfarism and articulated an empirically precise
definition of economic efficiency; this theory is aptly named the Pareto Criterion.
See id. at 408 (discussing Pareto's contributions to economic analysis). The Pareto
Criterion uses individual preferences, based on full information of both known
and possible consequences, to determine whether a rule makes at least one person
better off without making another person worse off. See id. (explaining principles
of Pareto Criterion).
112. See id. at 410 (summarizing foundation and principles of Kaldor-Hick's
efficiency).
113. See id. (examining Kaldor-Hick's efficiency analysis). The "compensa-
tion" described is hypothetical; it is a costless transfer from those who benefit from
the rule to those who are harmed by the rule of an amount equal to their harm.
See id. (same).
114. See id. (summarizing Kaldor-Hick's efficiency analysis). Hypothetically,
under a Kaldor-Hick's efficient rule, the benefited parties could fully compensate
the harmed parties and still derive a benefit-this benefit is referred to as the
"surplus" and represents a net gain in social welfare. See id. (describing Kaldor-
Hick's efficient rule); see alsoJohn R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49
ECON. J. 696, 711-12 (1939) (examining principles underlying Kaldor-Hick's
efficiency).
115. See Deana Pollard Sacks, Intentional Sex Torts, 77 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1051,
1091 (2008) (noting net gain to society resulting from placing costs on cheapest
cost avoider).
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often resulting from easier, cheaper access to information or lower trans-
action costs.
1 1 6
Analyzing the Third Circuit's decision for economic efficiency, it is
clear that the benefits of informing a defendant of the mandatory mini-
mum sentence exceed the costs. 117 Here, the benefit is the value of pro-
tecting defendants' constitutional rights; because Americans highly value
their individual liberties, this benefit has an extraordinarily high value.
1 1 8
Furthermore, informing defendants of mandatory minimums would re-
duce the number of direct appeals and collateral attacks on final judg-
ments for Rule 11 violations-decreasing court costs.1 19 Conversely, the
cost of defining direct consequences to include mandatory minimums is
the expense, if any, of an increase in the number of post-conviction attacks
by defendants who entered pleas without being informed of the
mandatory minimums.
1 20
After a cost-benefit analysis conclusively reveals that informing de-
fendants of mandatory minimums is efficient, the next step in the Kaldor-
Hick's analysis is determining whether the judge or the defendant is the
cheapest cost avoider.1 2 1 Requiring defendants to inform themselves of
the applicable penalties would be extremely costly because there are a
high number of defendants, each with a relatively low understanding of
the complexities of federal and state sentencing guidelines. 122 Each of
these numerous defendants would incur significant search costs trying to
determine the permissible sentence range, forcing defendants to incur
high information and transaction costs.' 2 3
116. See id. ("[L]iability should be placed on the 'cheapest cost avoider,'
which is the party who has easier, cheaper access to the information needed to
accurately calculate accident costs and avoidance costs."); see also Guido Calabresi
&Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060
(1972) (noting costs should be placed on party who is "in the best position to
make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs
and to act on the decision once it is made") (emphasis omitted).
117. For an analysis of the economic efficiency of the rule announced inJami-
son, see infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
118. SeeUnited States v. Andrades, 169 F.3d 131, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A crimi-
nal defendant's plea of guilty is perhaps the law's most significant waiver of consti-
tutional rights, and district courts must not accept this waiver lightly.").
119. See DeWaelsche, supra note 2, at 527 (describing benefits of strict adher-
ence to Rule 11).
120. See Note, Rule 11, supra note 108, at 1415 (speculating "[post-conviction
attacks] may well cancel out much of the savings in judicial time and resources that
the reliance on guilty pleas was meant to produce").
121. See Sacks, supra note 115, at 1091 (asserting cheapest cost avoider should
bear burden to increase net societal gain).
122. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 3 (indicating that for fed-
eral district courts, in fiscal year 2004, there were 83,391 defendants).
123. See Michael W. Loudenslager, Giving Up the Ghost: A Proposal for Dealing
with Attorney "Ghostwriting" of Pro Se Litigants' Court Documents Through Explicit Rules
Requiring Disclosure and Allowing Limited Appearances for Such Attorneys, 92 MARo. L.
REv. 103, 133 (2008) ("These judges 'expressed concern about pro se litigants who
appear before them having received limited assistance from an attorney and hav-
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Alternatively, the cost imposed on ajudge forced to inform the defen-
dant of the mandatory minimums would be insignificant. First, the num-
ber ofjudges in the federal and state judicial system is limited. 124 Second,
judges must be aware of the applicable minimum and maximum sentence
range to comply with sentencing guidelines; therefore, no added cost is
associated with researching this information. 125 Thus, judges have mini-
mal information costs. Finally, judges are already responsible for inform-
ing the defendant, on the record, of certain requisite information; adding
one additional requirement would not unduly burden the judge.' 26
Based on the foregoing, the judge is the cheapest cost avoider; therefore,
it would be less costly for the judges to inform the defendants of the appli-
cable mandatory minimums. 127 From an economic perspective, the Third
Circuit's rule in Jamison is efficient, resulting in a net gain to society. 128
V. CONCLUSION
Departing from its previous holdings, the Third Circuit's decision in
Jamison enhances defendants' rights by expanding the definition of direct
consequences to include mandatory minimum sentences. 129 Although
this decision is consistent with the congressional mandates of Rule 11 and
the Supreme Court's decision in Boykin, it represents an anomaly in the
ing little or no understanding of the contents of the pleadings these litigants have
filed."' (quoting Fla. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 79-7 (Reconsid-
eration) (2000))).
124. See Public Citizen, Federal District Judges Are Vastly Outnumbered by State
Judges, http://www.citizen.org/documents/FederalDistricJudgesvastlyoutnum-
beredbystatejudges.pdf (last visited May 12, 2009) (noting, in 2003, there were
9,200 state judges in general jurisdiction courts and 678 federal judges in district
court).
125. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90 (2007) ("[D]istrict courts
[are required] to read the United States Sentencing Guidelines."). See generally
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation,
58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901 (1991) (discussing current role of United States Sentencing
Guidelines); Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425 (2000) (same); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sen-
tencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101
YALE L.J. 1681 (1992) (same).
126. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 (1969) ("(T]he record ex-
amination of the defendant [ ] should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself
that the defendant understands the nature of the charges ... the acts sufficient to
constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of
sentences.").
127. Cf Sacks, supra note 115, at 1091 (providing criteria for determining
cheapest cost avoider).
128. Cf Graham, supra note 111, at 410 (presenting principles of efficiency
under Kaldor-Hick's analysis).
129. See Jamison v. Klem, 544 F.3d 266, 277 (3d Cir. 2008) (determining
judges must inform defendants of applicable mandatory minimum sentence to
protect defendants' fundamental constitutional rights).
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guilty plea jurisprudence of the other circuit courts. 130 Recognizing the
vital importance of ensuring individuals' constitutional rights, and consid-
ering the legislative history of Rule 11, the majority of circuit courts cur-
rently classifying mandatory minimums as collateral consequences should
adopt the Jamison holding classifying mandatory minimums as direct
consequences.
This is not to say that Jamison marks the beginning of an unbounded
expansion of defendants' rights during the plea process; rather, Jamison is
an exception to the overall trend narrowing defendants' rights. 13 1 As this
recent trend indicates the circuit courts' unwillingness to independently
enhance defendants' rights, it is likely that the circuit courts will expand
defendants' rights only to the extent necessary to comply with the enumer-
ated requirements of Rule 11.132 Therefore, unless Congress intercedes,
theJamison decision will represent the last major expansion of defendants'
rights during the plea process.
Kristen M. Hall
130. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit's holding in Jamison is consis-
tent with congressional and judicial aims, see supra notes 97-102 and accompany-
ing text. Although it has been thirty-five years since Rule 11 was amended,
explicitly requiring courts to inform defendants of mandatory minimum
sentences, most courts still fail to comply with this statute. See DeWaelsche, supra
note 2, at 528 (noting judges' failure to comply with Rule 11).
131. The majority of circuit court decisions handed down after the Supreme
Court announced the direct-collateral distinction expanded the definition of col-
lateral, such that a defendant need not be informed of the consequence to enter a
knowing guilty plea. See Chin, supra note 49, at 705-06 (noting recent circuit court
cases addressing direct-collateral distinction). For citation to several circuit court
cases that expand collateral consequences while narrowing direct consequence,
see supra note 106.
132. Cf Chin, supra note 49, at 705-06 (noting that, after Supreme Court an-
nounced direct-collateral distinction, circuit courts avoided expansion of defend-
ants' rights by broadening scope of collateral consequences).
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